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More and more organizations today are contributing to public debates through communication 
campaigns and advocating their own values (Manfredi-Sánchez, 2019; Polonsky, 2017), and many have tried 
to influence policy formulation by building public support with advocacy campaigns (Bsumek, Schneider, 
Schwarze, & Peeples, 2014; Gulbrandsen, 2009; Ihlen et al., 2018). Although there is a considerable research 
literature on strategic communication and lobbying that focuses on how business and interest groups affect 
policy formulation, create coalitions, and negotiate alternatives (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & 
Leech, 2009; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008; Tresch & Fischer, 2015), there is one specific actor—trade 
unions—that is active in lobbying but is often neglected in such research. In Western societies with high levels 
of activism, trade unions have historically played a central role in promoting societal equality, achieving better 
conditions and fairer wages for workers, and overall developing a more moral economy by exerting pressure 
on legislative bodies (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011). Hence, unions have positioned themselves as promoters of 
the public interest. To achieve this goal, trade unions must constantly leverage their internal legitimacy to push 
for social changes and to maximize their influence in the political sphere through a mix of communication and 
noncommunication activities (Binderkrantz & Krøyer, 2012). Literature on trade unions’ strategic 
communications is, however, limited despite the fact that communication plays a strategic role not just for the 
achievement of these organizations’ goals, but, above all, for shaping societies and democracies where unions 
operate. Unions are also an important social actor contributing to public discussions on matters that have 
societal and policy-related implications. Their strategic communication can thus influence what people think is 
relevant to discuss and even regulate, and what course of actions political leaders should take. 
 
To get a better understanding of how such influence is exercised, this study explores the strategic 
communication efforts of trade unions by focusing on how trade unions’ goals are communicatively framed 
to emphasize the public interest. Much of the lobbying literature on businesses and interest groups argues 
that building alliances and claiming that a proposal serves the public interest will help these organizations 
gain influence. But is the same true for trade unions? How do they communicatively handle their interests 
with broader societal benefits and values? Because of the specific organizational nature and function of trade 
unions in societies, that is, to represent “the self-interest of a particular economic or social group” (Coxall, 
2001, p. 5), we would expect that a key communicative challenge for unions is to argue that the interest of 
their members equates to the public interest. 
 
In this study, we explore this challenge by investigating how trade unions communicatively 
construct the notion of public interest to influence political and public spheres. Essentially, this study 
explores the framing strategies of trade unions when campaigning (Zarefsky, 2008), and how such strategic 
communication choices resonate with democratic values such as working for the public interest. It is argued 
that, to understand the power and influence of organizations in society, it is paramount to explore how 
organizations through communication gain such power and influence. To this end, we posed the following 
research questions: 
 
RQ1: How do trade unions communicatively construct links between union interests and the public interest? 
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RQ2: How is this strategy reconciled with the more conflict-oriented framing found in much traditional 
union discourse? 
 
To answer these research questions, we employed framing theory and relied on a multiple case 
study approach to explore public lobbying campaigns promoted by Italian, Norwegian, and UK trade 
unions. The comparative approach is well suited here given that the chosen unions, as we elaborate later 
in the article, have different traditions and historical trajectories and different starting points and 
opportunities for framing the public interest. Overall, this study contributes to framing theory by showing 
how contextual and historical elements (political systems and trade union histories) influence the framing-
building process in these organizations and the strategic communication and lobbying literatures by 
exploring how the notion of the “public interest” is central to their framing strategies in aiding trade 




The Public Interest 
 
The public interest is a concept that has been debated for a long time within political science and 
lately in strategic communication (e.g., see, Cochran, 1974; Johnston, 2016; Lippmann, 1955). In strategic 
communication, the public interest is often considered a normative ideal for conducting persuasive 
communications in an ethical manner (Messina, 2007), for raising professionals’ values and standards 
(Bivins, 1993), and even for broadening the purposes of the profession (Johnston, 2016) beyond those of 
serving the private interests of powerful entities. Yet, the term is still considered too elusive to guide the 
practice of strategic communication (Messina, 2007). 
 
Walter Lippmann (1955) suggests that the public interest is “what men would choose if they saw 
clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently” (p. 50). It is certainly a notion that is 
seen as a counterpart to private interests, that is, interests that only benefit a few. Still, the concept of 
public interest is highly problematic, and a number of epistemic issues are involved in defining the idea. 
How precisely can it be known and how can we decide on the matter? Are we to rely on procedural 
approaches: “The public interest is what emerges from deliberative processes that occur within 
democratically legitimated institutions” (Anthony, 2013, p. 128)? Others have attempted to define it as 
“those outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a 
‘public’” (Bozeman, 2007, p. 17). However, at the same time, it must be recognized that contemporary 
society is constructed from conflicting values and divergent interests. This also means that the public interest 
is always contingent in the sense that no one definition of the public interest can ever be viewed as final. 
The public interest must always be considered in the context of time and space: “It only comes into existence 
and is consequently defined when we voice and debate our concerns and views” (Simm, 2011, p. 560). 
Indeed, it has been argued that the debate about the public interest is part and parcel of “the democratic 
game itself” (Bitonti, 2017, p. 161). This means that the democratic process is one in which several political 
actors will present often contradictory claims that their proposals will serve the public interest best. It has 
been argued that because the concept is frequently invoked but seldom defined in practical discourse, it is 
“an empty vessel, waiting to be filled with whatever values the user wishes. This lack of definition renders 
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the concept vulnerable to capture by interest groups” (Feintuck, 2004, p. 2). This points to the importance 
of evaluating such claims, and one way of unpacking a public interest argument is to look at how it is framed. 
 
Framing Theory and Lobbying 
 
Framing denotes the activity of highlighting “some aspects of a perceived reality and [making] 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 
1993, p. 52). Frames are important for the analysis of power and the treatment of political issues (Carragee 
& Roefs, 2004; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011); thus, they can be employed in political contests to define 
the scope of issues, who is responsible for or affected by the issue, and which enduring values are relevant 
(Pan & Kosicki, 2001). 
 
Framing studies have been characterized by two macro traditions: The social science tradition has 
focused on identifying and counting the presence of specific frames and their impact on those exposed to 
them, and the rhetorical tradition views framing as a communication strategy employed by a communicator 
to achieve a specific goal. The rhetorical tradition is thus concerned with investigating how and why a 
communicator employs specific frames in his or her communication (Kuypers, 2010; Souders & Dillard, 
2014). Most framing literature has focused on media frames; studies on frames adopted by other social 
actors have been limited (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Ihlen at al., 2018; Lock, Stachel, & Seele, 2020; 
Tsetsura, 2013), despite the fact that the public sphere is characterized by a multitude of frames produced 
by different social actors. These social actors’ strategic communication efforts are important because they 
potentially shape frames used by news media and other actors (cf. Entman, 2004; Lock et al., 2020). Frames 
from different actors compete for media and public attention (Baumgartner et al., 2009); thus, 
understanding frame competition has become an important and relevant research area in communication 
studies, including investigating how opposing frames are presented together (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) 
and how certain ones gain influence (Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
 
In the context of public affairs, framing theory has been applied to specific studies on frame 
competition by different interest groups (e.g., Boräng et al., 2014; Lock et al., 2020), in EU policy framing 
(e.g., Daviter, 2007), and in relation to interest groups’ lobbying efforts toward the European Commission 
(e.g., Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 2015). Frame production and the strategic choices of different actors that 
impact policy are seldom discussed from a public interest point of view. Lobbyists, as organizational 
communicators, are in the business of using strategic communication to achieve a specific political goal 
(Kuypers, 2010); thus, they are likely to attempt to construct frames showing how their proposal addresses 
a public policy that has certain causes and has to be addressed in a way that serves the public interest. 
However, the ability lobbyists have to use appeals to the public interest is contingent on a number of factors. 
Businesses typically stand accused of only pursuing a profit motive with little regard for the public interest. 
Unions, on the other hand, are frequently labeled as representing sectorial interests (Coxall, 2001) or faulted 
for only pursuing the interests of their members. In general, it has been argued that “we know remarkably 
little about how interest groups choose their frames” (Klüver et al., 2015, p. 481). This and other lobbying 
studies using framing theory mostly stop short of looking at the communicative construction of the frames 
and the strategic communication choices made by lobbyists. Instead, studies typically perceive frames as 
more or less discrete, stable entities that you choose from, for instance, whether or not an issue is framed 
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individually or collectively, creating an individual or a collective frame (e.g., Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2008). 
To understand the different starting points, it is thus necessary to study “the specific social, legal, cultural 
and time contexts” (Johnston, 2016, p. 1). The next section deals with the historical background and position 
of unions in the countries focused on in the current study. 
 
Unions: Among Market, Society, and Class 
 
As noted, much has been written about the political “ends” of lobbying and less about the 
communicative “means” to achieve these political ends. This article contributes to the latter. In this study, 
three trade unions from three European countries (Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom) were chosen. Table 
1 summarizes the main characteristics of these three countries from political and trade union points of view. 
 
Table 1. Overview of the Main Characteristics of Trade Unions in the Selected Countries. 
Main characteristic 
Country 
Italy Norway United Kingdom 
Type of democracy Consensual Consensual Majoritarian 
Executive parties dimension  High High Low 
Federal unitary dimension  Low Low Low 
Interest group pluralism Medium Low High 
Type of unionism  Class-oriented Civil society-oriented Market-oriented 
 
According to Lijphart’s (2012) democracy classification, the United Kingdom is a good example of a 
majoritarian democracy, scoring low on the executive parties dimension (e.g., low values indicate single-party 
dominance in cabinets, majoritarian electoral systems), as well as the federal unitary dimension (e.g., low 
values indicate centralized government, flexible constitutions). Norway and Italy score high on the first, but 
low on the second. In terms of interest group pluralism, however, there is a huge difference between the two 
latter countries. Italy scores medium-high, although not as high as the United Kingdom. Norway scores lowest 
of all. Norway, for instance, has been characterized as a corporatist country and has used a tripartite model in 
which unions have been negotiating with employers’ associations and the state (Kjelstadli, 1998). 
 
Within these political systems, trade unions have developed different trajectories and influencing 
roles as they have faced different forms of interplay among market, society, and class, which influence their 
identity (Hyman, 2001). Yet, three macro ideal types can be found: market-oriented unionism, civil society 
unionism, and class-oriented unionism (Hyman, 2001). 
 
The United Kingdom is considered the prime example of market-oriented unionism in which unions 
first and foremost are labor market institutions engaged in collective bargaining. The history of trade 
unionism in the United Kingdom is largely one of strife with government and confrontation with big business. 
Since the Industrial Revolution, British governments have legislated to prohibit trade unions and collective 
bargaining by British workers. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, trade union power was at its zenith and 
membership had reached its highest-ever figure of 13 million, more than 55% of the British workforce 
(McIlroy, Fishman, & Campbell, 1999). One result of a range of antitrade union legislation in the 1980s and 
1990s was that membership declined steeply in the period (Moylan, 2012). Whereas the decline of heavy 
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manufacturing industry and the casualization of the workforce have impacted greatly trade union 
membership, in some sectors, it remains strong, such as in the railway industry. 
 
Norway is an example of civil society unionism. Here, unions focus on improving workers’ conditions 
and status in society more generally and are part of a broader struggle for social justice and equality. The 
civil society orientation of Norwegian unionism has led to a more cooperative and consensual form of 
unionism than in Italy and the United Kingdom. The idea of cooperation has been crucial in balancing 
relations between management and employees in Norway (Kjelstadli, 1998). In the period before the 1980s, 
the system was characterized by extensive public–private cooperation, particularly with regard to industrial 
policy. Several new unions were established that were not part of the corporative setup; hence, these new 
actors had to rely on lobbying (Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 390). A key take-away point is that the Norwegian 
political establishment has been union-friendly. 
 
Finally, Italy is the major example of class-oriented unionism in which the struggle between capital 
and labor takes the front stage. Traditionally, Italian unions were associated with a particular political party. 
Changes in the political structure and changes within the union federations mean that this political 
categorization is no longer fitting (Regalia, 2012). The first union was established during the fascist regime 
and represented all workers in the overall economy. Post-World War II and the Cold War destabilized this 
union endeavor and paved the way for a split and the creation of other unions (Regalia, 2012), such as 
Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions (CISL) and the Italian Union of Labor. Unlike many European 
countries, Italy has no labor code or specific industrial relation laws. Unionism is governed by a complex 
system of collective agreements, pacts, workplace agreements, laws, decrees, and regulations. Italian trade 





This study used a qualitative approach to explore how trade unions invoke the public interest to 
advance their strategic objectives. Specifically, three campaigns (see short case descriptions in the Analysis 
section) that took place in Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom were selected because they are distinctive 
examples of framing organizational goals in the public interest. Moreover, these campaigns received media 
coverage and the unions argued their cases publicly. Although it is not possible to generalize, the campaigns 
are illustrative of how trade unions use the public interest frame in their strategic communication initiatives 
and permit us to study these organizations’ communicative efforts in action (Stake, 2005). To compile the 
case description and gain insights on each campaign’s milestones, we sought media coverage of the cases 
via national media archives (subscription based) in the leading national newspapers in each country. 
Searches were conducted in the native languages and were built around a string involving the name of the 
trade union and keywords for the campaign’s main issues. After having gained important insights into the 
campaigns’ core messages, we conducted semi-structured elite interviews with representatives who had 
been deeply involved in the chosen campaigns. We chose to conduct elite interviews because we were 
interested in understanding the strategic communication choices of trade unions when framing their 
organizational goals under the public interest notion rather than studying different perspectives and views 
on the campaigns. As other scholars have noted (Baker & Edwards, 2012; Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009), 
when “the interviewees are of less interest as a person than their capacities as experts for a certain field of 
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activity” (Flick, 2009, p. 165), a few key interviews are “an effective means of quickly obtaining results” and 
“practical insider knowledge” (Bogner et al., 2009, p. 2). Each interview lasted approximately 60–90 
minutes, and was taped and transcribed by research assistants. Consent forms were given and data 
collection and storage followed General Data Protection Regulation guidelines for good ethical and privacy-
related practices in research. The interviewees read and approved the transcripts and no changes were 
required. Relevant quotes from Italian and Norwegian interviewees and written material were translated 
into English by the authors. To triangulate the interview data, we collected official publications on the 
campaign produced and made available online by each trade union in their association’s websites. We also 
gained access to internal strategy documents from the unions, and looked at public relations material in the 
form of text on websites and ads in news media outlets (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Overview of Data Collected. 
Source 
Country 
Italy Norway United Kingdom 
Unions in focus Confederation of Trade 
Unions (CISL) 
The Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade 
Unions (LO) 
UK National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport 
Workers (RMT) 
 
Interviewees 1 CISL communication 
manager responsible for 
the campaign 
LO head of public 




1 RMT senior lobbyist and 
policy officer 
Official documents 3 strategy documents+ 
1 policy proposal + 96 
press releases and event 
updates 
2 strategy documents 
+ 1 memo on 
arguments + 1 speech 
+ 1 placard 
8 public reports + 1 written 
report to the UK Parliament 
Select Committee for 
Transport + 1 transcript of 
oral evidence presented to 
the select committee + 76 
press releases 
 
Official Web pages Campaign URL page: 
http://www.fisco.cisl.it/, 
containing 5 URL pages 
entirely on the proposal 
and campaign initiatives 
 
Campaign URL page: 
http://mittarbeidsliv 
.no/, containing 6 
stories from the future 
RMT site: 
https://www.rmt.org.uk/ho
me/ +campaign URL page: 
http://actionforrail.org/reso
urces/  
Media material 1 official video ad + 1 
official audio ad, +15 
news stories 
18 news stories + 2 
opinion editorials + 1 
editorial 
29 news stories 
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In analyzing our data set, we chose an inductive approach that consisted of a close reading of the 
material in light of our research questions and theoretical framework. Our approach was in line with the 
rhetorical tradition in framing analysis (Kuypers, 2010), which intends “to understand how a rhetor wanted 
to frame his/her message, how it was executed and how it might plausibly have impacted the audience” 
(Souders & Dillard, 2014, p. 1009). In this regard, we were interested in the “meaning shaping nature of 
frames” (Souders & Dillard, 2014, p. 1009) and specifically the public interest frame. We thus paid particular 
attention to the four elements of Entman’s (1993) framing definition: problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation, and how these were discursively 
represented in our data set. As Souders and Dillard (2014) note, most framing studies focus on the 
transferring agent such as the news media and their impact on the consumers, such as public opinions, but 
overlook the original messaging strategies of rhetors, which is the focus of this study. This qualitative 
approach allowed us to explore the how and why of the campaign messages without reducing the findings 
to quantifiable data that can say little about the strategic thinking and the role of communication in 




The Italian Case: “Carer for All Italians” 
 
Several Italian governments from the left and right have tried to reform the country’s tax policy. 
Since the 1990s, personal income tax has strongly increased, becoming one of the main sources of revenue 
for the state, but also a great burden to workers (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2005). Reforms have mostly benefitted individuals in high-income brackets. In February 2015, CISL, under 
the slogan “For a More Equal and Fairer Taxation!” proposed a revision of tax policy and launched a 
grassroots campaign. The campaign was built around the argument that economic growth had to resume to 
avoid social conflict, strengthen income, and thus consumption of workers and pensioners. The campaign 
was mostly about promoting these objectives with a political initiative that sought the involvement of all 
citizens with a petition. CISL’s legislative proposal had five main political objectives: (1) extending the 80-
euro bonus to all tax-liable persons with an annual income below 40,000 euros, (2) removing any tax on 
the first house, (3) developing new family allowances to support families at risk of poverty, (4) reducing 
local taxes, and (5) introducing a “mini-capital-tax” for those with assets worth more than 500,000 euros. 
 
The crucial objective was to shake the economy of the country through a legislative proposal 
that we asked citizens to endorse with their signatures. . . . The campaign aimed at informing 
and educating people about our objectives, and at the same time make them support our 
specific proposal. (CISL communication manager, personal interview, March 8, 2017) 
 
To gain collective benefits, CISL used an anticipatory, value creation strategy combined with direct 
and indirect lobbying tactics (Olson, 1965). The campaign lasted approximately six months (February–July 
2015) and approximately 500,000 signatures were submitted to the Italian Parliament during Fall 2015. 
According to CISL, this campaign was very ambitious because it did not seek just the support of workers 
and pensioners, but anyone, the “whole universe of publics” (CISL communication manager, personal 
interview, March 8, 2017). Hence, it had to deliver messages that appealed to a wide group of people and 
via multichannel means. The campaign was visible on the CISL website, across traditional mass media, and 
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also in social media, including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Google+. Seven digital 
mobilizations, all under the hashtag #firmalacrescita (#signforgrowth), were implemented. CISL also used 
flash mobs and booths in the cities’ main squares to reach out to local publics. To keep the message simple 
and clear, CISL visual material consistently reminded people of the proposal objectives through the 
illustration of a hand and five fingers, one finger for each objective: 
 
We chose to depict a hand and the five fingers . . . for a need of simplicity. We chose it 
because we wanted to speak in a simple way to the citizens. Isn’t it easier to explain our 
campaign objectives through the fingers of a hand? (CISL communication manager, 
personal interview, March 8, 2017) 
 
According to the communication manager, CISL used a proactive, nonantagonistic strategy, in line 
with participatory principles and dialogic approaches. 
 
We realized a vox populi action. We travelled around Italy and directly asked citizens to 
tell us what they thought about our proposal and initiatives. We then recorded them and 
made them available in the Web, mostly on YouTube. We then called our delegates and 
supporters to virally diffuse these videos across channels. (CISL communication manager, 
personal interview, March 8, 2017) 
 
The proposal was also written in a clear, actionable manner addressing the current situation of 
many people: “It was a concrete proposal with concrete actions not a political stunt” (CISL communication 
manager, personal interview, March 8, 2017). Although not directly referring to the public interest, the 
communication strategy was built around the idea that the solution for the current nationwide economic 
problems lay in changes in taxation and social welfare policies. Hence, CISL communicatively articulated a 
message of caring for all Italians, for better policies and conditions while using an argument that a more 
equal society coupled with more state interventions could improve Italians’ conditions. Communicatively, 
CISL wanted to present itself as an “carer” of the majority of Italians, those, at least, who have been 
suffering the most because of an unbalanced tax system. Still, because of subsequent political turmoil, the 
political elections, and the change of political leadership in Spring 2018, this issue has moved toward a 
broader discussion on whether or not to introduce a guaranteed minimum income. 
 
The Norwegian Case: “Relevance for All Workers” 
 
When a conservative/right-wing coalition government took power in Norway in October 2013, it had 
already announced that it would propose changes to the Working Environment Act. The changes would, for 
instance, make it easier to hire people on short contracts and would ease the regulations against work on 
Sundays (Øverbye, 2017). The changes were proposed before Summer 2014 and an alliance was forged among 
three of the largest unions, including the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), to combat the proposal. 
 
LO talked about how the Government’s proposed amendments to the Working Environment Act would 
mean increased uncertainty and a less inclusive workplace (Nielsen, 2015, January 14). In February 2015, the 
unions called a strike and 1.5 million of Norway’s 2.6 million workers participated in a two-hour general strike 
to protest the government proposal. In a rally speech in front of the Norwegian Parliament, the LO leader 
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explicitly framed the issue as being for and not against something: “I think it is more important to say what we 
are fighting for! We are fighting for dignity, security, freedom and decency in working life. . . . Good friends—
we are the ones that stand for justice” (speech manuscript, excerpt in internal document). Thus, the LO leader 
was attempting to take back an important keyword for politicians on the other side of the political spectrum. 
She also made references to “the Norwegian model” that builds on a strong three-part cooperation: 
 
To weaken a party undermines the Norwegian model. It is a gigantic experiment with the 
safety and freedom of workers. Our model of society is fought for by the unions. Those of 
us standing here. And not at least, the generations ahead of us. They have given us a 
legacy. Good friends—we will never give that legacy away! (speech manuscript, excerpt 
in internal document) 
 
The strategy material we were given access to pointed out that “this issue can be framed in a 
number of different ways” (internal document). Five examples were mentioned: “The ‘female’ perspective, 
the ‘youth is losing’ perspective, the ‘working life crime will increase’ perspective, the ‘more bureaucracy 
when the labor inspection authority will be increased’ perspective, and the ‘health/safety’ perspective. This 
means that we can keep the pressure up with constant new angles” (internal document). 
 
The strategist behind the union campaign acknowledged the conflict between fighting for the 
interests of their members and what could be considered as the public interest. To forge a connection here, 
they relied on moving the debate to a more general system level: 
 
The challenge is to reconcile self-interest and common interest. . . . You must 
communicate about a larger concern: the development of working life. . . . How the 
situation can be for your nephew that is tired of school. (Union strategist, personal 
interview, April 27, 2016) 
 
First, they wanted to address the problem on the system level and then add cases and examples 
for illustration, recognizing that “anecdotes eat statistics for breakfast. Every time” (Union strategist, 
personal interview, April 27, 2016). At the same time, the LO’s head of public relations and strategy was 
adamant that the union’s large membership base made it possible for them to argue that they did largely 
represent the public interest. The major rhetorical strategy then was to choose the tactical topic of work 
security as a shared political value and locate this on a national level, in other words, to make it relevant 
for all workers. It was argued that the proposed changes would create insecurity. The union strategists 
created a link to the public interest, but did not expect this argument to carry the weight in the short term. 
As anticipated, the changes were agreed to by the Parliament in March 2015. This particular campaign was 
forged with a long-term perspective and the message “Do not mess with us again.” 
 
The UK Case: “A Service for Everybody” 
 
The UK case focuses on the ongoing lobbying campaign surrounding rail policy in the United 
Kingdom. In the early 1990s, the national rail system was broken into regional segments to enable those 
segments to be franchised and put under the control of private companies. Ever since this privatization of 
rail services, at regular intervals, the wisdom of this policy has been publicly debated. We investigated the 
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public lobbying campaign of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and the 
umbrella organization Action for Rail (AFR), which the RMT uses to maximize the voice of a range of trade 
union actors. The RMT is very explicit that its aim is to renationalize Britain’s railway transport system: “Our 
goal is to bring the whole [rail] industry back into public ownership and run it as a public service” (RMT 
policy officer, personal interview, June 13, 2017). The trade union position is that the privatized rail 
companies are not serving the public interest in relation to transport. The public interest in their view is the 
provision of an affordable, safe, and efficient public transport system. In their narrative, the injection of the 
profit motive into the rail system has created incentives that work against the public interest (e.g., the 
withdrawal of staff from ticket offices and trains), thereby increasing potential safety risks to passengers. 
They also focus on claims that train fares in the privatized system have consistently increased faster than 
the rate of general wage growth, making rail transport increasingly less affordable for citizens. The RMT 
says that the general public is not benefitting; only a few shareholders gain, who benefit doubly from 
government subsidies and any profits made on rail networks. The trade union puts forward the public 
interest arguments centered on accountability and transparency of systems. A key RMT frame is to portray 
any public funds used to write off debts to make the franchising process viable as a misuse of public money. 
Equally, any dividend payments to shareholders are juxtaposed against areas of the rail service that clearly 
require additional investment: 
 
Passengers are paying more but getting less. Trains are often cancelled, delayed, 
overcrowded, and understaffed. While passengers pay more for the rail services, the 
dividends paid to rail company shareholders was £222M in 2014/15—a whopping increase of 
21% on the previous year. Instead of reinvesting the money back into the railways—to ensure 
the trains run on time, the rail network is properly staffed, and passengers’ fares are 
affordable—your money is lining the pockets of shareholders. (AFR statement, January 2017). 
 
The RMT policy officer noted that although the public interest argument is central to the union’s 
lobbying strategy, they had to lobby different audiences slightly differently: 
 
[W]e’ve tried to build support amongst passengers on the railway, who aren’t decision 
makers but we want them to try and influence their MP or write to the chief executive or 
do things; we’ll pitch things slightly different than we would if we were going direct to an 
MP. If we’re trying to lobby journalists and get journalists to understand a story and why 
it’s important, again you adopt a different approach with a journalist. (RMT policy officer, 
personal interview, June 13, 2017) 
 
In a UK media environment where most of the press is virulently antiunion, the RMT has used the 
AFR network as a “softer campaigning body” (RMT policy officer, personal interview, June 13, 2017) to lobby 
for renationalization. The policy officer explained that one must emphasize the public interest argument to 
ensure that there is seen to be a broad alliance in any lobbying and media campaign. 
 
As noted, the RMT uses its resources to help form an umbrella group AFR and is constantly reaching 
out to a range of consumer groups and environmental groups. It has even been prepared to form alliances 
with organizations, such as the Campaign for Better Transport, that only see partial renationalization of 
railways as a solution: 
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We work regularly with Freight for Rail [and] the Campaign for Better Transport is a 
partner you would want to be involved with because you know we each have our own 
different reaches and can talk to different people; [it] is a natural ally and there is no point 
in not being seen to have a common platform that reflects an agenda where we can all 
get to where we want to get to. (RMT policy officer, personal interview, June 13, 2017) 
 
After several decades of union “bashing” from successive UK governments and the British press, 
the RMT union is now acutely conscious that it must present itself as part of a campaigning coalition involving 




Our analysis of the three campaign’s framing strategies shows that despite historical union 
differences and differences in the political systems, unions relied on the notion of public interest in their 
campaigns’ framing strategies to achieve similar goals, that is, to bring public support to the union positions 
on the issue. Yet, the construction of the frames was slightly different. Specifically, in the Italian and UK 
cases, the campaigns’ purposes were to gain public support (lobbying for change) for a legislative proposal 
(Italy) and for a reversal of privatization (UK). In the Norwegian case, the campaign’s purpose was to block 
the government’s proposed changes to the Working Environment Act (lobbying for no change). Applying 
Entman’s (1993) framing definition elements (see Table 3), we can see that all three unions communicatively 
constructed the problem as something that was preventing achievement of the public interest, that is, 
preventing an equal society for Italy, job security for Norway, and reliable and safe transportation for the 
United Kingdom. They discursively constructed responsibility claims for not achieving the public interest to 
their respective governments, and they communicated a clear solution that was in line with the historical 
trajectories of these unions’ relations with their political systems. 
 
For instance, both Italy and Norway are considered consensus-oriented democracies (Lijphart, 
2012); thus, their chosen frames revolved around building consensus on their own problems, albeit in 
different manners. The Norwegian union discursively constructed the problem as a general one, affecting 
the whole society. The Norwegian union LO argued that the proposed changes to the Working Environment 
Act would hurt all Norwegian employees and also the Norwegian model. Thus, the union attempted to raise 
the issue to a more general system level, namely, that of the general conditions of working life and the 
assumed common wish of having a steady job. Given the history and position of the LO in the Norwegian 
political system, taking on the role as a defender of the public interest might come easier than for unions 
that have class struggle as their main motive (Hyman, 2001). The Norwegian unions form an important part 
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Table 3. Public Interest Frames in the Union Lobbying Campaigns. 
 Country 
Frame Italy Norway United Kingdom 
Problem There are increased social 
inequalities due to 
persistent low economic 
grow coupled with an 
unbalanced taxation 
system 
Proposed changes in the 
Working Environment Act 
threaten job security and 
inclusiveness 
Railway services are too 
expensive and 
overcrowded public 
money misspent on debt 
write-offs for private 
companies and dividends 
for shareholders 
 
Causality The current taxation 
system favors high-
income people and 
increases income gaps 
and class separation 
The changes will make it 
easier to hire people on 
short contracts and ease 
regulations against work 
on Sundays 
Privatization of railway 
services creates uneven 
service, decreases safety, 
and increases expenses 




A more equal society will 
decrease income gap and 
class separation 
Everyone needs job 
security and all 
Norwegian employees will 
be affected by the 
proposed changes 
There is a need for 
improved public 
accountability; profit 
motive may lead to cost 
cutting and risks to 
passenger safety 
 
Treatment The union proposal on a 
new taxation system and 
increasing social welfare 
policies will make society 
more equal 
The proposed changes to 
the Working Environment 
Act should be abandoned 
A centrally coordinated 
railway system under 
public ownership is best 
for the public 
 
 
The Italian union, on the other hand, constructed the problem as a class-oriented one, that is, an 
income-based inequality problem between social classes. This, arguably, illustrates the historical struggle 
between capital and labor of Italian unions as a type of class-oriented unionism (Hyman, 2001). Like the 
Norwegian union, CISL aimed at working collaboratively with all interested social partners, in line with its 
consensus-oriented democratic system (Lijphart, 2012). The approach toward the political elite was 
proactive and supportive to the extent that CISL wanted to offer concrete solutions to real problems that 
politicians could take up. The public interest frame was used in this campaign purposively to address CISL’s 
great focus on policy concertation. Compston (2003) defines concertation as “national level discussions 
between government representatives and representatives of peak employer and/or trade union 
confederations that lead to agreements on public policy” (p. 791). The public lobbying campaign was not a 
battle field of different interests, but rather was used as a common ground to construct legislative 
propositions that could actually be implemented. The campaign and the petition were thus instrumental to 
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make the specific issues of changing taxation policy and increasing social welfare “hot-issue topics” for the 
political agenda. The issues presented in this public campaign are illustrative examples of what Regalia 
(2012) notes about Italian trade unions’ latest trends on societal roles. 
 
As for the UK case, it is possible to note a different approach, contrasting in part its historical 
trajectory. The campaign was not built around a market notion as expressed in market-oriented unionism 
(Hyman, 2001), but through a broad-based coalition with other social actors expressing a “majoritarian 
view.” This was a strategic choice that can be explained in part because of the historical loss of power and 
influence of unions in today’s political context. In the United Kingdom, the RMT trade union and the umbrella 
organization it supports, the AFR, are always keen to avoid any impression that they are going “public with 
a narrow, self-serving issue” (Mack, 1997, cited in McGrath, 2007, p. 271). They consistently frame the 
transport problems in Britain as stemming from, and being perpetuated by, the narrow self-interests that 
privatization has served. In recent years, in particular, there has been a significant increase of industrial 
disputes over attempts by privatized rail companies to shed staff. The unions have repeatedly deployed the 
public interest frame of “rail safety” to try to combat these job reductions. The trade unions are lobbying 
for a return to a centrally controlled public railway system run for the public’s benefit and underpinned by 
“people before profit.” Historically, this can be seen as a departure for UK trade unionism that in the past 
tended to fight its battles as unions, but legislative changes and declining membership have forced different 
strategies on them and seeking out broad-based coalitions is clearly key to their claim in promoting the 
public interest in relation to rail transport. 
 
Overall, our findings show that contextual and historical elements influenced these organizations’ 
rhetorical choices when framing their messages, as they have influenced their overall strategic communication 
choices (consensus-building vs. confrontational approach) of their public lobbying campaigns. How these three 
organizations employed framing strategy and constructed the problem, causality, treatment, and solution in 
their campaign messages are largely similar, but they also show micro-level communicative differences that 
can be explained by the organizations’ history and their relations to their respective political systems and 
political contexts (Hyman, 2001; Lijphart, 2012). These findings are particularly relevant when taking into 
consideration recent theoretical developments in framing theory within the context of public affairs. Departing 
from de Vreese’s (2005) work, Lock and colleagues (2020) propose a revised framing process model for public 
affairs, which takes into consideration the different nature and purpose of framing—to influence decision 
making and policy formulation—in public affairs activities. This model, however, does not account for the 
influence of contextual and historical elements in the framing-building or -setting processes, which, our study 
shows to be important elements to understand frame building efforts. 
 
Conclusions and Limitations 
 
This comparative case study contributes to framing theory by (a) empirically studying a sociopolitical 
actor, trade unions, that has not been studied much (cf. Carragee & Roefs, 2004) within the context of public 
affairs; and (b) showing how contextual and historical elements (political systems and trade union histories) 
influence the framing-building process in these organizations. It does so by unfolding how these organizations 
create messages constructed around specific meanings and interpretations of the problem in focus via the use 
of the public interest notion. This can be considered a contribution to the rhetorical tradition in framing studies 
(Kuypers, 2010; Souders & Dillard, 2014) aimed at illustrating how trade unions’ rhetorical choices help them 
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achieve organizational goals that have an impact on society and the general public. The trade union lobbying 
campaigns reveal how these organizations approach advocating for one’s own interests through a public 
interest frame. This comparative study is unique in that it is one of the few empirical works illustrating how 
strategic communication and the public interest argument serve the purpose of union advocacy. 
 
The findings, although limited to one specific campaign in each case, show that the communication 
strategy of using appeals to the public interest and common values as suggested by the literature on 
lobbying (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Rommetvedt, 2011) is also used among sectional organizations such 
as unions. Given that the campaigns were designed to be media friendly and attention-grabbing public 
efforts, a framing around this motive seems an “obvious” solution for trade unions. 
 
This study also contributes to the literature on strategic communication and unions by showing (a) 
the specificities of employing a framing strategy in the context of unions; (b) the communicative construction 
of the frames (how unions translate their ideas into illustrations, symbols, and narratives that resonate with 
the general public); and (c) the versatility of the public interest notion, which was communicatively adjusted 
and culturally entrenched to serve similar, general union interests, yet different unions’ communication 
purposes. Overall, this case study documents the important communicative function of appealing to the 
public interest as a framing strategy for endorsing unions’ sociopolitical position and the importance of 
contextual and historical elements in the framing-building process. 
 
Given the qualitative nature of this comparative study and the peculiarities of the selected campaigns, 
the investigation has some limits. Given the focus on specific countries and specific campaigns, it is not possible 
to generalize. Furthermore, the analysis unfolds the unions’ perspective (framing-building process) and, 
particularly, how the strategists in charge of the campaigns saw and reflected on the actual activities. Hence. 
their view on how the public interest notion was communicatively used within the campaign is highly subjective. 
Despite these limitations, this comparative study on the strategic use of framing can offer some preliminary 
and valuable insights for theory building purposes (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), particularly in relation to the use of 
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